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BOOK REVIEWS
goes on to summarize the contents of each record group identified by its listed
series number.
Since many of the series record groups are either unindexed or inconveniently
organized to permit researchers to go quickly and efficiently to the location
of materials bearing on specific cases, the volume also has a valuable set of
appendices. These include a useful section describing the old forms of common
law actions, and another offering helpful "suggestions for locating case papers"
(p. 102). The book concludes with a detailed bibliography of published reference
works to assist the researcher in early New York case materials.
With the publication of this short volume, not only legal historians, but
also New York State historians, specialists in the Early Republic, and many
others have an indispensable guide to pursue research in these valuable records
of New York law and its legal system in the first half of the nineteenth century.
JOHN W. PRATY,
State University of New York
at Stony Brook
Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review. Lawrence,
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989. XII, 310 pp. $35.00.
Chief Justice Marshall's legendary opinion in Marbury v. Madison has
always been the center-piece of debate over the legitimacy and scope of the
power of judicial review. Unsurprisingly, then, Robert Lowry Clinton's thesis
that recent arguments about the judicial power reflect a modem revisionism
centers on the claim that the famous opinion has been pervasively misunderstood
in modem scholarly thought. Clinton's Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review
develops the view that Marbury was written to defend a very limited defensive
power of courts to disregard statutes that conflict with constitutional provisions
that directly govern the judicial function. The modem view that the founders
contemplated the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution,
and considered judicial rulings on constitutionality as in general binding on
the other branches, is thus an ahistorical vision that rests on a misreading of
the Marbury case itself.
Clinton arrives at these conclusions through an elaborate set of arguments
that attempt to explain the historical and theoretical underpinnings of the Marbury
argument. In brief, Clinton claims that Marbury can be understood only as
an outgrowth of (1) Blackstone's famous Tenth Rule of construction, by which
judicial review is perceived as a form of statutory construction, and (2) James
Madison's explication of the jurisdiction granted the judiciary as to cases "arising
under" the Constitution in terms of those cases deemed to be "of a judiciary
nature" (p. 23). According to Clinton, when modem thinkers miss the point
that judicial review was conceived as a form of construction rather than as
a "revisionary" power, they adopt a view which "leads inexorably to judicial
activism" (p. 23). The better view is that the Constitution is "implied within
every act of valid legislation" so that judicial review becomes an act of avoiding
contradiction in applying the "law" rather than an act of repeal of enacted law
(p. 24).
Moreover, even this Blackstonian form of review was further limited by
the Madisonian requirement, rooted in separation of powers thinking, that the
invalidated law conflict with commands given exclusively to the judicial branch
of government (pp. 27-29). And since courts can directly control only their own
judgments, this scheme of review is consistent with a very limited notion of
judicial finality that conflicts with the claims for judicial supremacy that have
HeinOnline -- 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 399 1992
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
abounded through the twentieth century (pp. 29-30). According to Clinton, these
more limited views of judicial power dominated American constitutional thought
until late in the nineteenth century (pp. 161-66).
Unfortunately, Clinton's analysis provides neither a fair reading of Marbury
nor a useful explication of the history of the power of judicial review. In the
first place, the analysis in Marbury rejects the assumptions that informed
Blackstone's rule of construction. The Tenth Rule of construction was designed
to harmonize Blackstone's doctrine of legislative sovereignty with Lord Coke's
famous dictum that courts might give effect to common right and reason. It
rested on the premise that judicial power to declare a clear statute invalid would
place the judiciary above the legislature and thus be subversive of government.
Marshall's entire argument, like the treatment in Federalist No. 78 that preceded
it, was designed in part to answer this very objection to judicial review by focusing
on the sovereignty of the people and the limited nature of the delegation of
power to the legislature. If the people are sovereign, and not the legislature,
judicial review does not imply judicial supremacy over the legislature but only
the supremacy of the will of the people embodied in their Constitution.I
Marshall thus used the conflict between the statute granting jurisdiction
to the Court and Constitution, and the resulting voidness of the statute, as
starting points for analyzing the issue of the Court's power. The question became
whether such a law could, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts. 2 All
of this reasoning appears immediately to reject the idea that the Constitution
is considered to be "implied within" challenged statutes, and the issue is presented
as one of resolving conflict rather than of reading constitutional and statutory
provisions harmoniously.
Thus although Clinton attempts to argue that the confederation-era decision
of Rutgers v. Waddington3 "is ancestral to Marbury" (p. 51), the court there
declined the invitation of counsel to refuse to enforce the statute outright (as
Marbury did) and expressly rejected the idea of a power to invalidate a law
unequivocally violating common law principles. Instead, the court adopted
counsel's alternative argument based on Blackstone's rule of construction, and
made it emphatically clear that the legislature had the power to override the
decision by an unequivocal statutory command.4 Justice Marshall does not so
much as hint that Congress could confer jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits
merely by enacting a more explicitly worded statute.
Nor did Justice Marshall indicate in any way that his argument for judicial
review would apply only to provisions specifically directed at the judiciary as
in the case before him. Marshall's notion of the judicial power to invalidate
laws rested on the duty of courts to give effect to the superior law of the
Constitution whenever it conflicts with the inferior law of the legislature. When
"both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case,"5 according to
Marshall, courts must choose. But that choice is presented whenever a litigant
asserts that the law of the Constitution secures an asserted right or prohibits
the exercise of government power that affects her preexisting, common law rights.
1. See The Federalist No. 78, in J.E. Cook, ed., The Federalist (Wesleyan University
Press, 1961), p. 525.
2. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Though unreported, the opinion in Rutgers is set forth in Julius Goebel, Jr., ed.,
The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 392.
4. For counsel's argument, see id., pp. 367-68, 382, 380-91. For the court's disposition,
see id., pp. 395-97, 415-19.
5. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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As illustrated by the Rutgers case treated above, which concerned an apparent
conflict between a statute and the law of nations, such a choice is not presented
to courts only when judicial functions are directly at issue.
Marshall posed this question: "And if [the courts] can open [the Constitution]
at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read or to obey?"6 Clinton answers,
contrary to the thrust of Marshall's rhetorical question, that courts can only
read and obey the portions specifically regulating the judiciary. But that is a
view of judicial power which cuts against the grain of Clinton's own description
of the "rule of construction" rationale. If the Constitution is implied in every
valid act of legislation, courts properly should be required to honor that aspect
of the statute whenever the statute affects the rights of parties properly before
the court, regardless of to whom the constitutional command is addressed. This
argument is so persuasive that at one point Clinton himself seems to adopt
it (p. 29), even while at most points rejecting it (pp. 23, 99).
More specifically, Marshall pointed to the prohibitions on state laws imposing
taxes or duties on exported products and the bans on bills of attainer of ex
post facto laws as examples of provisions that would require courts to prefer
the Constitution over the law. All of these limitations, however, are directed
at the legislature, not the judiciary, as Marshall recognized when he added to
these examples the provision regulating proof of treason and made a point of
noting that its language was "addressed especially to the courts."7
While Madison did believe that the power of judicial review was limited
to cases of a judicial nature, as Clinton asserts, it is not clear that his view
of the underlying concept conforms to Clinton's. In presenting his proposed
bill of rights to Congress, Madison asserted that these provisions would be
enforceable by the courts, consistent with Hamilton's insistence in Federalist
No. 78 that courts would be "the bulwarks of a limited constitution." The
commands in the bill of rights obviously go beyond ones directed to the judiciary.
Similarly, Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland conforms with
a broader reading of Marbury defended here, and clearly assumes the power
of the courts to rule on constitutional questions concerning the reach of
congressional powers that are unrelated to the power of courts generally.
Moreover, contrary to Clinton's assertion (pp. 106-07), Joseph Story defended
the power of courts to determine the constitutionally of acts of Congress unrelated
to judicial power and argued that Supreme Court decisions on such issues bound
other branches and levels of government. 9
Clinton correctly questions whether the broadest formulations of the judicial
function trumpeted in modern times are consistent with Marshall's view that
judicial review was incidental to a court's ordinary role in giving effect to binding
sources of law.' 0 Even so, his narrow reading of Marbury and of the idea of
cases "of a judiciary nature" mislead as much as the view he is opposing.
THOMAS B. McAFFEE,
Southern Illinois University School of Law
6. Id., p. 179.
7. Id.
8. See The Federalist No. 78, in J.E. Cook, ed., The Federalist (Wesleyan University
Press, 1961), p. 526; Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, and Charlene Bangs Bickford,
Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), reprinting James Madison's June 8, 17789 speech
to Congress, pp. 83-84.
9. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (De Capo
Press reprint, 1833 ed.), vol. 1, pp. 347-50.
10. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991), pp.
26-27.
1992
HeinOnline -- 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 401 1992
